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1. Introduction.
A growing theoretical literature has focused attention on the impact of risk on invest-
ment, and has suggested that the impact may be large. The reason is that most investment
expenditures are at least in part irreversible - sunk costs that cannot be recovered if market
conditions turn out to be worse than expected. In addition, firms usually have some lee-
way over the timing of their investments - they can delay committing resources until new
information arrives. When investments are irreversible and can be delayed, they become
very sensitive to uncertainty over future payoffs. For example, in a simple and fundamental
model of irreversible investment, McDonald and Siegel (1986) demonstrated that moderate
amounts of uncertainty consistent with many large industrial projects could more than dou-
ble the required rate of return for investments.' Hence there is reason to expect changing
economic conditions that affect the perceived riskiness of future cash flows to have a large
impact on investment decisions - larger, perhaps, than a change in interest rates.
This theoretical literature and the insight it provides may help to explain why neoclassical
investment theory has so far failed to provide good empirical models of investment behavior,
and has led to overly optimistic forecasts of effectiveness of interest rate and tax policies in
stimulating investment.2 It may also help to explain why the actual investment behavior
of firms differs from the received wisdom taught in business schools. Observers of business
practice find that the "hurdle rates" that firms require for expected returns on projects are
typically three or four times the cost of capital.3 In other words, firms do not invest until
1McDonald and Siegel assumed that the investment can be made instantaneously. The multiple grows
even larger when the project takes several years to complete; see Majd and Pindyck (1987). In these models
there is always uncertainty over future payoffs. In earlier models by Bernanke (1983) and Cukierman (1980)
the uncertainty is reduced over time, but there is again a value to waiting. Sunk costs affect exit decisions
in a similar way; see, e.g., Dixit (1989).
2As an example of the difficulty that traditional theory has had in explaining the data, consider the
model of Abel and Blanchard (1986). Their model is one of the most sophisticated attempts to explain
investment in a q theory framework; it uses a carefully constructed measure for marginal rather than average
q, incorporates delivery lags and costs of adjustment, and explicitly models expectations of future values
of explanatory variables. But they conclude that "our data are not sympathetic to the basic restrictions
imposed by the q theory, even extended to allow for simple delivery lags."
3The hurdle rate appropriate for investments with systematic risk will exceed the riskless rate, but not
by enough to justify the numbers used by many companies.
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price rises substantially above long-run average cost.
But most important for this paper, the irreversible investment literature suggests that if
a goal of macroeconomic policy is to stimulate investment over the short- to intermediate-
term, stability and credibility may be much more important than particular levels of tax
rates or interest rates.4 Put another way, this literature suggests that if uncertainty over the
evolution of the economic environment is high, tax and related incentives may have to be
very large to have any significant impact on investment spending.
If this view is correct, it implies that a major cost of political and economic instability
may be its depressing effect on investment. This is likely to be particularly important for
developing economies. For many LDC's, investment as a fraction of GDP has fallen during
the 1980's, despite moderate growth. Yet the success of macroeconomic policy in these
countries requires increases in private investment. This has created a sort of Catch-22 that
makes the social value of investment higher than its private value. The reason is that if
firms do not have confidence that macro policies will succeed and growth trajectories will
be maintained, they are afraid to invest, but if they do not invest, macro policies are indeed
doomed to fail. This would make it important to understand how investment depends on
risk factors at least partly under government control, e.g., price, wage, and exchange rate
stability, the threat of price controls or expropriation, and changes in trade regimes.
Our aim in this paper is to explore the empirical relevance of irreversibility and un-
certainty for aggregate investment behavior. We will be particularly concerned with the
relative experience of developing versus industrialized countries. Although there is consid-
erable anecdotal evidence that firms make investment decisions in a way that is at least
roughly consistent with the theory (e.g., the use of hurdle rates that are much larger than
the opportunity cost of capital as predicted by the CAPM), there has been little in the
way of tests of the theory. In addition, there have been few attempts to determine whether
irreversibility and uncertainty matter for investment at the aggregate level.
4We take it as a given that an important goal of macroeconomic policy is to encourage investment, largely
because of the importance of investment for economic growth. We will not attempt to survey the literature
relating investment to growth, and instead only point to the recent study by Levine and Renelt (1992), who
show that the share of investment in GDP seems to be the only "robust" correlate with growth rates.
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There are two reasons for the paucity of empirical work on irreversible investment. First,
although we know that irreversibility and uncertainty should raise the threshold (e.g., the
expected rate of return on a project) required for a firm to invest, we can say very little
about the effects of uncertainty on the firm's long-run average rate of investment or average
capital stock without making restrictive functional or parametric assumptions.5 The reasons
for this will be discussed shortly, but it means that tests cannot be based on simple equi-
librium relationships between rates of investment and measures of risk, whether for firms,
industries, or countries. Second, although shocks to demand or cost, as well as changes in
risk measures, do have implications for the dynamics of investment, there are serious prob-
lems of aggregation that make it difficult to construct and test models at the industry or
country level. Some of these problems have been spelled out by Caballero (1991, 1992), and
Bertola and Caballero (1990) show how one can derive a cross-sectional distribution for the
gap between the actual and desired investment of individual firms, and use it to construct a
model for the aggregate dynamics of investment.
An alternative approach is to focus on the threshold that triggers investment, and see
whether it depends on measures of risk in ways that the theory predicts. This has the
advantage that the relationship between the threshold and risk is much easier to pin down
than the relationship between investment and risk. The disadvantage is that the threshold
cannot be observed directly. This approach was used in a recent study by Caballero and
Pindyck (1992) of U.S. manufacturing industries, and it will provide one of the means by
which we gauge the impact of uncertainty in this paper.
In the next section, we briefly review the basic theory of irreversible investment, stressing
the value of waiting and its determinants. In Section 3 we extend this discussion by summa-
rizing a slightly modified version of the model developed in Caballero and Pindyck (1992),
and clarifying its empirical implications. Section 4 lays out our a framework for assessing the
effects of uncertainty - as measured by the volatility of the marginal profitability of capital
5Bertola (1989) and Bertola and Caballero obtain results for the firm's average capital stock by making
such assumptions. Bertola, for example, shows that irreversibility and uncertainty can lead to capital
deepening in long-run equilibrium, even though the firm has a higher hurdle rate and initially invests less.
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- on investment at the aggregate level, and describes our data set. Section 5 presents a set
of regressions that help us gauge the importance of volatility for investment. It shows that
decade-to-decade changes in volatility have a moderate effect on investment, and that the
effect is greater for developing than for industrialized countries. In Section 6 we ask whether
traditional measures of economic and political instability can explain the volatility of the
marginal profitability of capital. We find that only inflation seems to be clearly correlated
with this volatility. Finally, Section 7 studies the relationship between inflation and invest-
ment in more detail through semi-reduced form investment equations estimated with annual
data for 1960-1990 for six "high-inflation" developing countries, as well as for six OECD
countries.
2. Review of the Theory and Its Implications.
It is useful to begin by summarizing the basic intuition underlying the theory of irre-
versible investment under uncertainty, and some of the more important results from the
literature. For a more detailed introduction to the theory, see Dixit (1992), Pindyck (1991),
and Dixit and Pindyck (1993).
It is helpful to think of an irreversible investment opportunity as analogous to a financial
call option. A call option gives the holder the right, for some specified amount of time,
to pay an exercise price and in return receive an asset (e.g., a share of stock) that has
some value. Exercising the option is irreversible; although the asset can be sold to another
investor, one cannot retrieve the option or the money that was paid to exercise it. A firm
with an investment opportunity can likewise spend money (the "exercise price") now or in
the future, in return for an asset (e.g., a project) of some value. Again, the asset can be sold
to another firm, but the investment is irreversible. As with the financial call option, this
option to invest is valuable in part because its net payoff is a convex function of the future
value of the asset obtained by investing, which is uncertain. And like the financial option,
one must determine the optimal "exercise" rule.
This analogy raises another issue - how do firms obtain their investment opportunities
in the first place? The short answer is through R&D and the development of technological
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know-how, ownership of land or other resources, or the development of reputation, market
position, or scale. But this suggests that understanding investment behavior requires that
we understand not just how firms exercise their investment opportunities, but also how
they obtain those opportunities (in part by investing, e.g., in R&D). This second issue is
complicated by the fact that it is dependent on market structure. In this paper we will
largely circumvent this issue by assuming competitive markets with free entry, and we will
focus instead on how investment options are exercised. However, the reader should keep in
mind that in so doing, we are ignoring what may be an important part of the story.6
Once we view investment as the exercising of an option, it is easy to see how uncertainty
affects timing. Once a firm irreversibly invests, it exercises, or "kills," its option to invest.
It gives up the possibility of waiting for new information to arrive that might affect the
desirability or timing of the expenditure; it cannot disinvest should market conditions change
adversely. This lost option value is an opportunity cost that must be included as part of the
cost of the investment. As a result, the simple NPV rule that forms the basis of neoclassical
models, "Invest when the value of a unit of capital is at least as large as its purchase and
installation cost," must be modified. The value of the unit must exceed the purchase and
installation cost, by an amount equal to the value of keeping the investment option alive.
By how much must the simple NPV rule be modified? One way to answer this is by
looking at the basic model of McDonald and Siegel (1986). They considered the following
problem: At what point is it optimal to pay a sunk cost I in return for a project whose value
is V, given that V evolves according to the following geometric Brownian motion:
dV = arVdt + uVdz, (1)
where dz is the increment of a Wiener process. Eqn. (1) implies that the current value
of the project is known, but future values are lognormally distributed with a variance that
grows linearly with the time horizon. Thus although information arrives over time (the firm
observes V changing), the future value of the project is always uncertain.
6 For example, Lach and Schankerman (1989) show for firm level data, and Lach and Rob (1992) show
for 2-digit U.S. manufacturing data, that R&D expenditures Granger-cause investment in machinery and
equipment, and not the other way around.
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We want an investment rule that maximizes the value of investment opportunity, which
we denote by F(V). Since the payoff from investing at time t is Vt - I, we want to maximize:
F(V) = max E[(VT - I)e-PT], (2)
where T is the (unknown) future time that the investm: ,s made, p is a discount rate, and
the maximization is subject to eqn. (1) for V. For this problem to make sense, we must also
assume that a < p; otherwise the firm would never invest, and F(V) would become infinite.
We will let 6 denote the difference p - a.
The solution to this problem is straightforward. (See Chapter 5 of Dixit and Pindyck
(1993) for a detailed exposition.) The optimal investment rule takes the form of a critical
value V* such that it is optimal to invest once V > V*. The value of the investment
opportunity (assuming the firm indeed invests only when V reaches V*) is:
F(V) = aVo, (3)
where : is given by:7
= 2-(p-6)/ - + l( -t2-2 > 1. (4)
The constant a and the critical value V* are in turn given by:
V* = 1 (5)
and
V* - I
(V*)- /3Ip-1 
The important point here is that since / > 1, V* > I. Thus uncertainty and irreversibility
drive a wedge between the critical value V* and the cost of the investment .8 Also, since
7The reader can check that > 1, that limoo,, P = 1, and that limnb7 0o f = p/(p-6). (Hence lim_0o P =
oo if 6 = p, i.e., if a = 0.)
sIf a > 0 so that < p, V* > I even if a = 0. The reason is that by delaying the investment, the present
value of the cost is reduced at a rate p, whereas the present value of the payoff is reduced at the smaller rate
p - a. Hence there is again a value of waiting. See Chapter 5 of Dixit and Pindyck (1993) for a detailed
discussion of this point.
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Figure 1: Dependence of V*/I on a.
9/oa < 0, this wedge is larger the greater is a, i.e., the greater is the amount of uncertainty
over future values of V.
Characteristics of the Investment Decision.
It has been shown in several studies that the wedge between V* and I can be quite
large for reasonable parameter values, so that investment rules that ignore the interaction of
uncertainty and irreversibility can be grossly in error. For example, if a = 0 and p = 6 = .05,
V*/I is 1.86 if a = .2, and is 3.27 if a = .4. These numbers are conservative; in volatile
markets, the standard deviation of annual changes in a project's value can easily exceed 20
to 40 percent. Figure 1 shows V*/I as a function of a for p = .04 and 6 = .02, .04, and .08.
Note that moderate changes in a (e.g., from 0.3 to 0.4) can lead to large changes in V*/I,
particularly if 6 is small. Hence investment decisions can be highly sensitive to the extent of
volatility.
To see how the optimal investment rule depends on the other parameters, suppose the
firm is risk-neutral and p = r, where r is the risk-free interest rate. Let k = V*/I = /(:- 1)
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denote the multiple of I required to invest. Figure 2 shows iso-k lines plotted for different
values of 2r/a2 and 26/(a2. We have scaled r and 6 by 2/a2 because k must satisfy:
2r (26 k
a2 a2 k-1
As the figure shows, the multiple k is smaller when is large and larger when r is large.
As becomes larger (holding everything else constant except for ca), the expected rate of
growth of V falls, and hence the expected appreciation in the value of the option to invest
and acquire V falls. In effect, it becomes costlier to wait rather than invest now.
On the other hand, when r is increased, F(V) increases, and so does V*. The reason is
that the present value of an investment expenditure I made at a future time T is Ie - rT, but
the present value of the project that one receives in return for that expenditure is Ve- 6T .
Hence if 6 is fixed, an increase in r reduces the present value of the cost of the investment but
does not reduce its payoff. But note that while an increase in r raises the value of a firm's
investment options, it also results in fewer of those options being exercised. Thus higher
(real) interest rates can reduce investment, but for a different reason than in the standard
model. In the standard model, an increase in the interest rate reduces investment by raising
the cost of capital; in this model it increases the value of the option to invest and hence
increases the opportunity cost of investing now.
In practice, however, an increase in r is likely to be accompanied by an increase in 6,
because ca is unlikely to increase commensurately with r. The reason is that the expected
rate of capital gain on a project need not move with market interest rates. Hence it may be
more reasonable to assume that a remains fixed when interest rates change; then 6 = r - ac
will move one-for-one with r. As Figure 2 shows, if r and 6 both increase by the same amount,
the multiple k will fall. Thus an increase in interest rates can stimulate investment in the
short run by reducing the incentive to wait.
In summary, this simple model shows how uncertainty and irreversibility create an op-
portunity cost of investing, which increases the expected return required for an investment.
That opportunity cost is an increasing function of the volatility of the project's value, so
that an increase in volatility can, in the short run, reduce investment. An increase in the real
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interest rate has an ambiguous effect, and could conceivably lead to a short-run increase in
investment. Note, however, that these results tell us nothing about the long-run equilibrium
relationship between uncertainty and investment.
Related Models of Irreversible Investment.
In this basic model, the firm decides whether to invest in a single, discrete project. Much
of the economics literature on investment focuses on incremental investment. In the standard
theory, firms invest up to the point where the value of a marginal unit of capital just equals
its cost (where the latter may include adjustment costs). When demand and/or operating
costs evolve stochastically, this calculation is affected in two different ways.
First, uncertainty over future prices or costs can increase the value of the marginal unit
of capital, which leads to more investment. This only requires that the stream of future
profits generated by the marginal unit be a convex function of the stochastic variable; by
Jensen's inequality, the expected present value of that stream is increased. This result was
demonstrated by Hartman (1972), and later extended by Abel (1983) and others. In their
9
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models, constant returns to scale and the substitutability of capital with other factors ensure
that the marginal profitability of capital is convex in output price and input costs. But even
with fixed proportions, this convexity can result from the ability of the firm to vary output,
so that the marginal unit of capital need not be utilized at times when the output price is
low or input costs are high.9
As we have seen, when the investment is irreversible and can be postponed, the second
effect of uncertainty is to create an opportunity cost of investing now, rather than waiting
for new information. This increases the full cost of investing in a marginal unit of capital,
which reduces investment. Hence the net effect of uncertainty on irreversible investment
depends on the size of this opportunity cost relative to the increase in the value of the
marginal unit of capital. Pindyck (1988) and Bertola (1989) developed models in which a
firm faces a downward sloping demand curve, and showed that the net effect is negative -
the opportunity cost increases faster than the value of the marginal unit of capital.
Hence whether the investment decision is in terms of incremental capital or a discrete
project, uncertainty over the future cash flows that the new capital generates creates a
wedge between V* and I. But as one would expect, a wedge of this kind can also result from
uncertainty over policy or market driven variables such as interest rates or tax rates. This
has been illustrated in several recent theoretical studies.
For example, Ingersoll and Ross (1992) examined irreversible investment decisions when
the interest rate evolves stochastically, but future cash flows are certain. They showed that as
with uncertainty over future cash flows, this creates an opportunity cost of investing, so that
the traditional NPV rule will accept too many projects. Instead, an investment should be
made only when the interest rate is below a critical rate, r*, which is lower than the internal
rate of return, r, which makes the NPV zero. The difference between r* and r grows as the
volatility of interest rates grows. Ingersoll and Ross also showed that for long-lived projects,
a decrease in expected interest rates for all future periods need not accelerate investment.
9 Then the marginal profitability of capital at a future time t is max[O, (Pt - Ct)], where Ct is variable
cost. Thus a unit of capital is like a set of call options on future production, which are worth more the
greater the variance of Pt and/or Ct.
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The reason is that such a change also lowers the cost of waiting, and thus can have an
ambiguous effect on investment. As another example, Rodrik (1989) examined the effects
of uncertainty over policy reforms designed to stimulate investment (e.g., a tax incentive).
He shows that if each year there is some probability that the policy will be reversed, the
resulting uncertainty can eliminate any stimulative effect that the policy would otherwise
have on investment.'0
Studies such as these suggest that levels of interest rates and tax rates may be of only
secondary importance as determinants of aggregate investment spending in the short run;
changes in interest rate volatility and policy instability may be more important. At issue
is whether there is empirical support for this view. We will turn to that question after
considering the effects of uncertainty in the context of a market equilibrium.
Industry Equilibrium.
So far we have discussed investment decisions by a single firm, taking price (or, for a
monopolist, demand) as exogenous. Our concern, however, is with investment at the industry
or aggregate level, so that price is endogenous. When studying the effects of uncertainty
on investment in the context of an industry equilibrium, two issues arise. First, we must
distinguish among the sources of uncertainty - aggregate (i.e., industry-wide) uncertainty
and idiosyncratic (i.e., firm-level) uncertainty can have very different effects on investment.
Second, the mechanism by which uncertainty affects investment is somewhat different at the
industry or aggregate level than it is for an isolated firm.
The fundamental determinants of investment are the distributions of future values of
the marginal profitability of capital - if these distributions are symmetric (and the firm is
risk-neutral), uncertainty will not affect investment. For a monopolist, irreversibility causes
the distributions to be asymmetric because the firm cannot disinvest in the future if negative
shocks arrive; hence the firm invests less today to reduce the frequency of bad outcomes in
the future (i.e., the frequency of situations in which the firm has more capital than desired).
10Aizenman and Marion (1991) developed a similar model in which the tax rate can rise or fall, and showed
that this uncertainty can, in the short run, reduce irreversible investment in physical and human capital, and
thereby suppress growth. They also show that various measures of policy uncertainty are in fact negatively
correlated with real GDP growth in a cross section of 46 developing countries.
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In a competitive industry with constant returns to scale, the distribution of the future
marginal profitability of capital for any particular firm is independent of that firm's current
investment. But this distribution is not independent of industry-wide investment.
This makes it important to distinguish between aggregate and idiosyncratic uncertainty.
To see this, consider idiosyncratic and aggregate shocks to productivity that are both sym-
metrically distributed. Although either type of shock can affect the expected future market
price and hence the expected marginal profitability of capital, the idiosyncratic shocks will
lead to a asymmetric probability distribution for the marginal profitability only insofar as
the marginal revenue product of capital is convex in the stochastic variable. Aggregate
shocks, however, will always lead to an asymmetric distribution. Although negative shocks
can reduce the market price, positive shocks will be accompanied by the entry of new firms
and/or expansion of existing firms, which will limit any increases in price. As a result, the
distribution of outcomes for individual firms is truncated; negative shocks to productivity
will reduce profits more than positive shocks will increase them, and irreversible investment
will be reduced accordingly. l l
In a recent paper, Caballero and Pindyck (1992) examined the effects of idiosyncratic
and aggregate uncertainty using a simple model of a competitive market in which firms have
constant returns to scale and there is a sunk cost of entry. In their model the marginal
product of capital is linear in the stochastic state variables, thereby eliminating the positive
Jensen's inequality effect of uncertainty on the value of a marginal unit of capital that
arises from the endogenous response of variable factors to exogenous shocks. This lets them
focus on the way in which the effects of uncertainty are mediated through the equilibrium
behavior of all firms. They derive the critical rate of return required for investment, and
show how it is affected by aggregate (and not idiosyncratic) uncertainty, as well as other
parameters. They also show that the basic implications of the model are supported by 2-
digit U.S. manufacturing data. In the next section we show how a version of that model can
llSee Pindyck (1993) and Chapters 8 and 9 of Dixit and Pindyck (1993) for more detailed discussions
of this point, and Dixit (1991), Leahy (1991), and Lippman and Rumelt (1985) for models of competitive
equilibrium with irreversible investment.
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be used to study uncertainty and investment across countries.
3. Volatility, the Required Return, and Investment.
In this section we summarize the model in Caballero and Pindyck (1992), slightly modified
to allow for differentiated products. We then review some implications of the model for
the behavior of the required rate of return and investment at the industry and aggregate
economy-wide levels.
Consider an economy with a large number N(t) of very small firms producing what may
be differentiated products, and let Q(t) be an index of aggregate consumption that reflects
tastes for diversity. We will represent Q(t) by the CES function:
Q(t) = [JO [Ai(t)]pd i ; < p<l , (7)
where Ai(t) is the output of firm i. Hence the elasticity of substitution between any two
goods is 1/(1 - p) > 1.
Caballero and Pindyck decomposed the Ai(t)'s into average (aggregate) and idiosyncratic
components, and allowed each component to follow a stochastic process. We also decompose
Ai(t), but we assume that the idiosyncratic component is constant:
) N ( t )
Ai(t) = A(t)ai, such that A ai di = N(t).
Thus A(t) is average productivity, so that Q(t) = A(t)N(t), and ai is the productivity of unit
i relative to the average. Note that N(t) can fluctuate over time, even though the ai's are
constant, as firms enter or exit. We will assume that aggregate productivity, A(t), follows
an exogenous stochastic process, and that the ai's are randomly and uniformly distributed
across firms. At issue is whether each firm knows its own ai before entering, or only learns
it after entering; we address this below.
We take aggregate demand to be isoelastic:
P(t) = M(t)Q(t)- " , (8)
where M(t) also follows an exogenous stochastic process representing aggregate demand
shocks. We also assume that there is an exogenous rate of depreciation or firm "failures," ,
so that in the absence of entry, dN(t)/dt = -N.
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Assume for now that firms only learn their relative productivities ai after entry, so there
is no selective entry. Hence before entry, every firm expects to face the same price P. (Ex
post, some firms will produce more than others, so actual prices will vary.) To introduce
irreversibility, we assume that entry requires a sunk cost F. Then, free entry implies that:
F > Eo [f P(t)At)e-( (r) t dt] (9)
where r is the discount (interest) rate. The expectation Eo is over the distribution of the
future marginal profitability of capital, P(t)Aj(t), and therefore accounts for the possible
(irreversible) entry of new firms.
As long as we assume that firms cannot enter selectively, the results in Caballero and
Pindyck again apply. In this case, the marginal profitability of capital for a firm considering
entry is the average value of output, which we denote by B(t):
B(t) P(t)A(t) = M(t)A(t) N(t)- . (10)
We will assume that A(t) and M(t) follow uncorrelated geometric Brownian motions with
drift and volatility parameters a, and a, and a, and am, respectively. Then B(t) will follow
a regulated geometric Brownian motion; entry will keep B(t) at or below a fixed boundary
U. When entry is not occurring, B(t) will follow a geometric Brownian motion, with a rate
of drift:
ce 57 771 7-1 2/ = am - a,,+ - + a, - -2
2 rl 77 2/ a
and with volatility:
ab = +a + 012 ) e
As shown in Caballero and Pindyck (1992), the boundary U is given by:
U A
A (r + 6-p-ab) , (11)F A- 1
where 12
, _3 + ~//2 + 2(r + 6)(A 2 (12)
ab
12A solution will exist if the discount rate is large enough so that the value of a firm remains bounded
even if future entry is prohibited. This requires that 6 + 7 - 1 - 2a/2 > 0, so that A > 1.
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It is easy to show that Eo ffo Ue-(r+6)tdt > F. Because of irreversibility, there is an
opportunity cost of investing now rather than waiting; if firms could "uninvest" and recoup
the cost F, we would instead have the Marshallian result that Eo fo Ue_(r+6)tdt = F. It
can also be shown that (U/F)/aab > 0 and (U/F)/8I3 < 0, i.e., the opportunity cost
increases when the volatility of B(t) increases, and decreases when the rate at which B(t) is
expected to approach U increases. The reason for this first result should already be clear.
As for the second, an increase in implies that B(t) will on average be closer to U, so that
there is a reduced risk of "bad" outcomes, and hence a smaller opportunity cost of making
a sunk cost investment.
Note that in this model, there is no investment until the expected "return" on a new
unit of capital, B(t)/F, reaches the critical level U/F, and then investment occurs so that
B(t)/F cannot rise above this level. This is a result of our assumption that there is no
selective entry, so that all firms face the same threshold for investment. It would be more
reasonable to assume that firms, which are heterogeneous, have at least some knowledge of
their relative productivities before they enter, so that they have different thresholds. Then
different firms will invest at different times, and for every firm the required threshold will
increase if the volatility of aggregate demand or productivity increases.
For example, suppose all potential entrants know their ai's before entry. Then the free
entry condition (9) becomes:
F aiEo [/o P(t)A(t)e(r+6)t dt] , (13)
Now the value of output for firm i is Bi(t) = aP(t)A(t) = aB(t), and the firm will invest
when Bi reaches a threshold Ui. However, in this case the value of the firm will depend
not only on B(t), but also on the number of firms N(t) currently producing. This adds
another state variable to the problem, so that (given some distribution for the ai's) finding
Ui requires the solution of a partial differential equation for the value function.
Empirical Implications.
It is important to be clear about what this model and others like it do and do not tell
us about uncertainty and its effects on investment. First, note that these models do not
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describe investment per se, but rather the critical threshold required to trigger investment.
In the model of an industry equilibrium discussed above, the threshold is U; in the simple
model of investment in a single project reviewed in the preceding section, the threshold was
a critical project value, V*. In both cases the predictions of the models were with respect
to the dependence of the threshold on volatility and other parameters. The models tell us
that if volatility increases, the threshold increases. 13 Only to the extent that we can also
describe (or make assumptions about) the distribution across firms of the values of potential
projects, or of the marginal profitability of capital, can we also derive a structural model
that relates volatility to actual investment.
Even without going this far, we can draw inferences from these models with regard to
the ways in which investment should respond in the short run to changes in volatility: and
other parameters. For example, a one-time increase in volatility should reduce investment
at least temporarily, as project values that were above or close to what was a lower critical
threshold are now below a higher one. Second, we saw in our equilibrium model above that
an increase in the drift, , lowers the critical threshold, and hence should be accompanied
by an increase in investment." Hence increases in the volatility of the marginal profitability
of capital, or decreases in its average growth rate (when it is below the boundary U), should
lead to at least a temporary decrease in investment. In the next section we will discuss this
in more detail in the context of our empirical tests.
Unfortunately, there is very little that can be said about the effects of uncertainty on the
long-run equilibrium values of investment, the investment-to-output ratio, or the capital-
output ratio. To see this, note that although we know that an increase in volatility raises
the required return needed to trigger investment, we do not know what it will do the average
13This is not exactly correct, in that we have assumed in these models that volatility is constant. If
volatility can change, predictably or unpredictably, then in principle the process by which it changes should
be part of the model. However, models of financial option valuation in which volatility follows a stochastic
process suggest that adding this complication would not change our results substantially. For examples of
option valuation models with stochastic volatility, see Hull and White (1987), Scott (1987), and Wiggins
(1987).
14 Remember that B(t), the marginal profitability of capital, follows a regulated and therefore stationary
process. The parameter 3 is the drift of B(t) when it is below the threshold (i.e., upper boundary), U.
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realized return. The reason is that the firm requires a higher return to invest when volatility
is higher, but it does so exactly because it is more likely to encounter periods of very low
returns (when it will find itself holding more capital than it needs).
Or, consider the investment-to-output ratio, I/Q. In long-run equilibrium, we have
I/Q = KPK/Q(K)P = (PK/P)(6K/Q(K)). If the volatility of the marginal revenue
product of capital increases, the required return increases, and investment falls for any given
set of prices, so that the price of output P rises and PK/P falls. Suppose the production
technology is Cobb-Douglas with constant returns. Then 5K/Q(K) = 6/AL=K -a rises.
These two effects work in the opposite direction, so we are unable to conclude what will
happen to I/Q. Another way to see this is to note that, as before, that an increase in
volatility results in a higher threshold but also a greater frequency in which the firm holds
more capital than it needs, so that the productivity of capital could fall on average, i.e., I/Q
could rise. Hence we cannot claim on theoretical grounds, for example, that countries with
more volatile or more unstable economies should have, on average, lower ratios of investment
to GDP or lower capital-output ratios than countries with more stable economies.
For this reason, Caballero and Pindyck framed their tests in terms of the required return
U/F. Although U/F cannot be observed directly, one can obtain a proxy for this variable by
using extreme values of the marginal profitability of capital - for example, the maximum
over some period of time, or an average of the values in the highest decile or quintile.
Caballero and Pindyck showed that for U.S. manufacturing data, such proxies indeed show
a positive dependence on the volatility of the marginal profitability of capital. As discussed
below, we will perform versions of such tests using aggregate country data. However, we will
also examine how period-to-period movements in volatility affect investment.
4. Methodology and Data.
We have seen that the threshold that triggers investment depends on the characteristics
of the marginal profitability of capital - in particular, its volatility and its average rate of
growth when it is below the threshold. We therefore begin by positing a simple production
structure, and calculating time series for the marginal profitability of capital for a set of
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countries. We then use these time series to obtain measures of volatility. This section
describes these procedures, discusses the data, and explains our statistical methodology.
Framework of Analysis.
We assume that the economy is competitive, and we represent the gross value of output
(Gross Domestic Product plus the value of imported material inputs) by a Cobb-Douglas
production function with constant returns to scale:
Y = AK KLaLMA M with K + aL + aM = 1, (14)
where Y is the real gross value of output, i.e., real GDP plus the real value of imported
materials (Mi), and K and L are inputs of capital and labor. Let PL and PM denote the
real (i.e., relative to the price of output) prices of labor and imported materials. Then we
can write the marginal profitability of capital as:
HCL/01K MI 0p L/cKp L aMCIKHK = K t0 L aM KAla1/-L/P-M/K (15)
Now substitute A = Y/K aKLLMI M into this expression:
cLa aM/~ IM y61aK
"K = aKaL aM PKaKLLMa M L M (16)
Note that HK is the average value of output B(t), as given by eqn. (10). We will work
with b(t) = log B(t):
b (t) = caKaL/aKaM/K) + -- PL,t - PM,t, (17)
aM aK aK aK
where at = yt- aKkt - aLt - aMmt is the Solow residual, and where lowercase letters
represent the logs of the corresponding uppercase variables.
We calculate b(t) using eqn. (17) for a set of 30 countries, of which 14 are LDC's, and
the remainder are OECD countries. For each country, we use aggregate data on real (in
local currency terms) GDP, the quantities of imported materials, labor, and capital, and the
corresponding price indices. (We use the real exchange rate as the price index for imported
materials.) We discuss the calculation of b(t) in more detail below and in the Appendix.
Given these series for b(t), we gauge the importance of uncertainty for investment in the
following ways:
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1. We first use extreme values of b(t) as proxies for the threshold u = log U for each
country. (We use four proxies - an average of the three largest values of b(t) over the
sample period, an average of the six largest values, and an average of those values of
b(t) that correspond to the three or six years with the highest rates of investment.)
Next, we calculate the sample standard deviation of the annual changes in b(t) over
the full sample period, and the average rate of change of b(t) over periods that ex-
clude the extreme values. We then run cross-section regressions to determine whether
the threshold proxies are indeed positively related to the sample standard deviation
and negatively related to the average growth rate. These regressions also let us esti-
mate the semi-elasticity that measures the percentage change in the required return
corresponding to a change in the standard deviation.
2. We next measure the short- to intermediate-term dependence of investment on volatil-
ity by dividing the sample into three subperiods - 1962-71, 1972-80, and 1981-89 -
and calculating the sample mean and sample standard deviation of the annual changes
in b(t) for each subperiod. We then run panel regressions to determine the dependence
of the ratio of private investment to GDP on this standard deviation and mean in each
period.
3. An increase in the volatility of the marginal profitability of capital should, at least in
the short- to intermediate-term, reduce real interest rates. Recall from our discussion
in Section 2 that investment is likely to be highly inelastic with respect to the interest
rate (and may even be an increasing function of the interest rate). Hence an increase
in the volatility of b(t) (or decrease in its mean growth rate) that shifts the investment
schedule to the left and leaves the saving schedule unchanged will result in a lower
level of interest rates. To test this, we calculate the mean real interest rate for each of
the three subperiods, 1962-71, 1972-80, and 1981-89. We then run panel regressions to
determine the dependence of the interest rate on the standard deviation and mean of
the annual changes in b(t) for each subperiod.
4. We would also like to know the extent to which the volatility of b(t) can be explained
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by a variety of indicia of economic and political instability. Economic indicia that we
examine include the mean rate of inflation, the standard deviation of annual changes in
the inflation rate, and the standard deviations of annual changes in the real exchange
rate and real interest rate. As political indicia, we consider the set of political instability
variables used by Barro and Wolf (1991) in their study of growth, as well as the
Cukierman-Edwards-Tabellini (1992) estimates of the annual probability of a change
in government. As we will see, the mean inflation rate turns out to be the most robust
explanator of volatility.
5. Finally, we focus on a group of six "low inflation" OECD countries and a group of six
"high inflation" developing countries in more detail, and examine the extent to which
annual rates of investment for each group can be explained by annual rates of inflation
as well as by other indicia of economic instability. We find that of these variables,
inflation is the most significant explanator of investment, particularly during periods
of high inflation.
The Data.
To calculate the marginal profitability of capital, we work with the gross value of pro-
duction, Y, which is the sum of real GDP plus the real value of imported materials, both
measured in domestic currency units. The capital stock, K, is the real local currency value
of each years average stock of machinery, equipment, and non-residential structures. Labor,
L, is the total number of workers per year. Material inputs, M, is the real local currency
value of imports of intermediate goods. The labor and capital shares aL and aK are at
factor cost, net of capital consumption and indirect taxes, and the share of material inputs
is aM = 1 - a K - aL. The real (product) wage is the average annual nominal wage divided
by the GDP deflator, and the real price of imported inputs is a local currency price index of
an import composite divided by the GDP deflator. The Appendix provides a more detailed
description of the construction of the variables used in our analysis, and the sources of data.
Table 1 shows the standard deviation and mean of the annual log rate of change of B(t),
calculated for the three subperiods 1962-1971, 1972-1980, and 1981-1989, for our sample of
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30 countries. Also shown is the average value of the ratio of private investment-to-GDP for
each interval of time. Our regressions will use these subperiod averages, as well as averages
for the entire sample period. Note that the standard deviations and means for the Philippines
are about an order of magnitude larger than those for the other countries. This is due to very
large annual fluctuations (up to 50 percent) in the data for the real wage in the Philippines.
We find the wage data difficult to believe, so we omit the Philippines from our sample in all
of the work that follows.
5. Cross-Section Evidence.
In this section we use our cross-section of countries to examine the dependence of in-
vestment and its determinants on the volatility of the marginal profitability of capital. We
first work with proxies for the threshold (or required return), and then look directly at the
dependence of investment on volatility using averages for our three subperiods. We also ex-
amine the dependence of interest rates on volatility, again using averages for the subperiods.
In each case we will focus on differences between LDC's and OECD countries.
Volatility and the Required Return.
Changes in the volatility of the marginal profitability of capital affect investment by
affecting the threshold at which firms invest. At the aggregate level, firms with different
productivities will hit their thresholds at different times, so there will always be some invest-
ment taking place. When the marginal profitability of capital is high relative to its average
value, more firms will be hitting their thresholds and aggregate investment should be higher.
Hence although we cannot observe the threshold directly, we can use extreme values of b(t)
as a proxy.
As in Caballero and Pindyck (1992), we examine several different variables. First, we
compute the average of the top decile (three observations) of the 28 annual values of b(t)
for each country, which we denote by DBDEC, and the average of the top quintile (six
observations), which we denote by DBQUINT. In both cases we calculate these values
relative to the country mean of b(t). We average over several extreme values rather than
using the maximum value because b(t) may rise above the threshold u temporarily if there
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are lags in investment or predictable temporary increases in b(t).
An obvious problem with these proxies is that a higher standard deviation of the dis-
tribution of b's can imply larger extreme values of b even if the model were not valid. We
therefore calculate alternative measures of u based on the behavior of investment itself. For
each country, we calculate and order a series for the change in the real capital stock, AK(t),
find the times t, t 2, and t 3 corresponding to its three largest values. and then find and aver-
age the corresponding values of b(t); the resulting variable is denoted DBKDEC. Finally,
we likewise calculate a variable DBKQUINT using those b's corresponding to the top six
values of the AK's.
Table 2 shows cross-section regressions of each of these proxy variables on SDAB, the
sample standard deviation of Ab(t), and AB, the sample mean of Ab(t). (Note that AB is
calculated excluding the extreme values of b(t) that are used in DBDEC, etc.) All of these
regression results are consistent with the basic theory. In each regression the coefficients on
SDAB are positive (although statistically significant only for DBDEC and DBQUINT),
and the coefficients on AB are negative.
As in Caballero and Pindyck, we can use these regression results to estimate the semi-
elasticity A log(U/F)/Ab, i.e., the percentage change in the required return corresponding
to a change in the volatility. Using the DBQUINT and DBKQUINT regressions (which
have the highest R 2 in each pair) puts this semi-elasticity in the range of 1 to 3. Thus
an increase of .05 in the standard deviation of annual percentage changes in the marginal
profitability of capital should increase the required return on investment by 5 to 15 percent.
To put this in perspective, such an increase in SDAB occurred in Venezuela and Spain
between the periods 1972-80 and 1981-89 (see Table 1), so that if the required return in
those countries had been 20 percent, it would rise to about 21 to 23 percent. This is a
qualitatively important (but not overwhelming) effect, and is similar to the results obtained
by Caballero and Pindyck for two-digit U.S. manufacturing industries (they found the semi-
elasticity to be in the range of 1.2 to 1.8).
These regression results also give us an estimate of the semi-elasticity A log(U/F)/A/3
in the range of -3 to -5. Thus an increase in the drift of Ab(t) of, say, .02 (which would
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not be atypical for the countries in our sample) would reduce the required return by 6 to 10
percent, e.g., from 20 percent to 18 or 19 percent. But note that this does not mean that
an increase of productivity growth of 2 percent per year would reduce the required return
for investment by 6 or 10 percent. Remember that P is the drift of Ab(t) when b(t) is below
its threshold. Hence this result only tells us that an economy in which productivity grew 2
percent faster than otherwise during recoveries would have a lower required return.
Volatility and Investment.
We have estimated the extent to which an increase in volatility can increase the required
return for investment, but without a model that describes the distribution of returns across
firms and its evolution through time we can say little about the effect of volatility on in-
vestment itself. Furthermore, the theory tells us nothing about the relationship between
volatility and investment in a steady-state equilibrium; it only tells us that an increase in
volatility (or decrease in the drift rate) should be accompanied by an at least temporary de-
crease in investment. To explore this, we divide our sample into three subperiods - 1962-71,
1972-80, and 1981-89 - and we calculate the sample mean and sample standard deviation
of annual changes in b(t) for each. We then run panel regressions that relate the ratio of
private investment to GDP to these measures of the drift and volatility.
The regressions are shown in Table 3. Note that in each case the number of observations is
twice, and not three times, the number of countries (because the lagged investment-to-GDP
ratio is an explanatory variable). Each equation includes a dummy variable for the 1981-89
subperiod to account for structural change or other variables that might affect investment.
Regressions are run for the full sample of 29 countries, and then for the LDC's and OECD
countries separately.
These regression results are mixed. They show a negative relationship between volatility
and the rate of investment for the full sample, but the coefficients on SDABT are significant
at the 5 percent level only for the LDC's, and have the wrong sign for the OECD countries.
This is the case whether or not we include the drift variable, AB, on the right-hand side.
Also, note that the drift variable is positive (but insignificant) only for the LDC's.
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For the LDC's, the implied effect of volatility on the rate of investment is moderately
important. The estimate of the coefficient on SDABT is about -40, which means that an
increase in volatility of .05 corresponds to an 2 percent drop in the investment-to-GDP ratio
for a period of several years. This is a significant drop given that for most countries the
average ratios are less than 20 percent. The coefficient on SDABT is about half as large,
however, for the full sample of 29 countries, and suggests that a .05 increase in the standard
deviation of Ab(t) would lead to less than a 1 percent drop in the ratio of investment to
GDP.
Volatility and Interest Rates.
As an additional experiment, we can examine one of the general equilibrium implications
of the theory. To the extent that investment is highly inelastic with respect to the interest rate
(or even an increasing function of the interest rate), and savings is an increasing function
of the interest rate, an increase in the volatility of b(t) should, at least in the short- to
intermediate-term, reduce real interest rates. The reason is that an increase in the volatility
of b(t) (or decrease in its drift rate) should at least temporarily shift the investment schedule
to the left, thereby lowering interest rates. To test this we calculate the mean real interest rate
for each of the three subperiods, and then run panel regressions to determine the dependence
of the interest rate on SDAB and AB.
The regression results are shown in Table 4, first for the full sample of 29 countries, and
then for LDC's and OECD countries separately. In each case the estimated coefficient of
SDAB is negative as expected, and while it is statistically significant at the 5 percent level
only for the LDC's, it is nearly significant for the full sample and for the OECD countries.
Note that the coefficient estimate of -38 for the full sample implies that a .05 increase in the
standard deviation of Ab(t) leads to about a 200 basis point drop in the real interest rate.
This is a very large effect, in part explained by the low interest-elalsticity of savings found in
cross-country savings regressions for developing countries.1 5 This result must be viewed with
caution, however, given the quality of the interest rate data for the LDC's. The estimated
SSee Giovannini (1983) and Schmidt-Hebbel, Webb, and Corsetti (1992).
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coefficient for SDABT is only about one fourth as large for the OECD countries. Also, note
that the coefficient on AB is always insignificant and has the wrong sign in two cases.
6. Sources of Volatility.
We have seen in Section 3 that the volatility of the log of the marginal profitability of
capital is a summary statistic that describes all of the uncertainty relevant for investment
decisions. A question that then arises is to what extent can this volatility be explained by
various indicia of economic and political instability. For example, do the level or volatility of
inflation, or the volatility of real exchange rates or interest rates help to explain the volatility
of b(t)? And do indicia of political instability, such as the political variables used by Barro
and Wolf (1991) in their recent study of determinants of growth, have much to do with the
volatility of b(t)? These questions are impdrtant because if increases in the volatility.of b(t)
even temporarily depresses investment, we would like to know what economic or political
factors can cause such increases.
Table 5 shows simple correlations of SDAB with four economic indicia and seven political
indicia of instability. The economic variables are the mean inflation rate (INF), the average
annual standard deviation of the change in the inflation rate (SDAINF), the average annual
standard deviation of the change in the real exchange rate (SDARER), and the average
annual standard deviation of the change in the real interest rate (SDAR), in each case
calculated over the full sample period for each country. The first political variable, PROB,
is the annual probability of a change in government, as estimated from a probit model by
Cukierman, Edwards, and Tabellini (1992), using data for the period 1948-1982. The other
political variables, ASSASS, CRISIS, STRIKE, RIOT, REVOL, and CONCHGE,
are the average number of assassinations, government crises, strikes, riots, revolutions, and
constitutional changes per year over the period 1960-85, and are from Barro and Wolf (1991).
The table shows correlations for the LDC's and for the OECD countries.
Only INF, SDAINF, and SDAR are significantly correlated with SDAB for both the
LDC's and OECD countries. However, these variables are also highly correlated with each
other. (For example, the correlation of INF with SDAINF is above .90.) Of the political
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variables, only ASSASS, STRIKE, and RIOT are significantly correlated with SDAB,
and then only for the LDC's.
We ran a large set of cross-section regressions in order to explore the ability of these
economic and political variables to "explain" the volatility of b(t). Table 6 shows only a
small subset of these regressions, but the results are representative of our overall findings.
Most important, the mean inflation rate is the only variable that is consistently significant as
an explanator of SDAB. Although SDAINF and SDAR are individually correlated with
SDAB, they are always insignificant when combined with INF in a regression. STRIKE
is also significant in these regressions, but only for the LDC's. As long as INF is also in the
regression, all of the other political variables are either insignificant and/or have the wrong
sign. This is true for the LDC's, the OECD countries, or when the regressions are run over
the full sample.
This suggests that strikes, riots, revolutions, and other forms of political turmoil and
uncertainty (as measured by these indicia) may have little to do with uncertainty over the
return on capital, and hence with investment. It may mean that as long as a government
can control inflation - an indicator of overall economic stability, and from which exchange
rate and interest rate stability tend to follow - it can limit the uncertainty that matters
for investment. These results also raise doubts regarding recent results in the literature that
relate indicia of political instability to growth. On the other hand, regressions of the sort
shown in Table 6 have serious limitations. Aside from the very limited sample of countries,
the most important limitation is our assumption that the relevant stochastic state variables
follow Brownian motions, so that b(t) follows a controlled Brownian motion. This eliminates
"peso problems" as a source of uncertainty.
If we take these results at face value, they suggest that controlling inflation should be
one of the most important intermediate objectives of policy. We explore this in more detail
in the next section.
7. Time Series Evidence.
The cross-country evidence presented above suggests that inflation may be one of the
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best indicia of economic instability, and is associated with lower rates of capital formation.
This seems to be particularly true at very high levels of inflation. In this section we explore
the relationship between inflation and investment in more detail by examining a group of
six OECD countries that have had relatively low inflation, and a group of high inflation
countries, predominantly in Latin America. Our objective is to examine the robustness of
the relationship between inflation and investment across countries with very different levels
of inflation, and to explore possible nonlinearities in this relationship within each country
group.
To do this, we study the relationship between year-to-year variation in different indicators
of economic instability and the ratio of investment to GDP. This is important, because our
use of nine-year averages in Section 5 may have concealed higher-frequency information.
In this section we report on panel regressions that utilize annual data relating the ratio of
investment to GDP (total and private) directly to three indicia of economic instability - the
level and variability of inflation, and the variability of the real exchange rate. (Unfortunately
annual data are not available for indicia of social and political instability.) This allows us
to capture possible effects of economic instability on investment that may occur though
channels other than the volatility of the marginal profitability of capital.' 6
Of particular concern to us is inflation, which can affect investment in several ways:
(i) High and volatile inflation may indicate an inability of the government to control the
economy (see Fischer (1993)). As a consequence, government policies will be perceived by
investors as unsustainable and hence risky, leading them to defer investing. (ii) High and
volatile inflation is associated with greater volatility in the marginal profitability of capital,
and with volatile relative prices (see Fischer and Modigliani (1978) and Fischer (1986)).
(iii) Inflation amounts to a tax on real monetary balances. Hence if money and capital are
complementary - through the production function or through cash-in-advance constraints
- inflation and investment will be negatively correlated.' 7
16Fischer (1986, 1991, 1993) discusses several channels through which inflation may affect growth and
capital formation.
17Fischer (1993) and Kormendi and Meguire (1985) have found such a negative correlation.
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Low Inflation OECD Countries.
We first estimate a fixed effects panel regression for the ratio of total investment to GDP
for France, Germany, Japan, the Netherlands, the United Kingdom and the United States,
using annual data covering the period 1960 to 1990. In this model the investment-to-GDP
ratio is a function of variables such as the rate of inflation, the standard deviation of annual
changes in the inflation rate, and the standard deviation of annual changes in the real ex-
change rate, as well as the lagged rate of real GDP growth and the lagged investment-to-GDP
ratio. In the estimation, the White procedure was used to correct for heteroscedastic errors
and the H-test did not reject the null hypothesis of absence of first-order serial correlation.
Each variable is measured as a deviation from its corresponding country mean, so that the
model can be written as:
(I/GDP)i,t = aINFi,t + a2SDINFi,t + a3SDRERi,t + a 4GRTHi,t_1 + a 5(IGDP)i,t_l + Ei,t
(18)
where (I/GDP)i,t is the ratio of investment to GDP in country i in year t, INF is the mean
inflation rate for the year, SDINF is the sample standard deviation of each year's monthly
observations of inflation, SDRER is the sample standard deviation of the real exchange
rate, and GRTH is the rate of growth of real GDP.
Selected results of estimating this model for total investment are shown in Table 7.
(The results are similar for private investment.) The economic volatility variables INF,
SDINF, and SDRER are highly correlated with each other, but when all three are included
in the regression, only the coefficient of INF in negative and significant. INF is also
highly significant in any pairwise combination with SDINF and SDRER, but SDRER
is significant only by itself or in combination with SDINF. These results suggest that of
the three indicia of economic volatility, the level of inflation is the most robust explanator
of investment, but the volatility of relative prices - proxied by the volatility of the real
exchange rate - has an independent contribution in explaining investment.
To further explore the relationship between inflation and investment for this group of
countries, we show in Figure 3 the average values for both variables for the subperiods
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1960-1973 and 1974-1990. Note that the negative relationship between inflation and the
investment-to-GDP ratio is strongest for average rates of inflation above 5 percent per year;
below that level the relationship is blurred. As the scatter diagram shows, most instances of
average annual inflation rates over the 5 percent threshold belong to the period 1974-90, when
inflation accelerated and capital formation declined in the OECD largely as a consequence
of the two oil price shocks and the subsequent adjustment process.
High Inflation Countries (Latin America and Israel).
Similar panel regression were estimated for Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Israel, and
Mexico, also using annual data for the period 1960-1990. Table 8 shows selected regressions
results, first for total investment and then for private.
Note that inflation always appears with a negative coefficient, but is statistically: signifi-
cant only for the total investment regressions. The standard deviation of inflation is'always
insignificant (and has a coefficient of correlation with the level of inflation of .89 in this
sample), and the standard deviation of the real exchange rate is negative and significant
in two of the three total investment equations. These results are again consistent with the
view that inflation, and to a lesser extent the variability of relative prices, are what matter
most for investment. Finally, when the ratio of public investment to GDP is included in the
equations for private investment, it is always negative and significant, suggesting a crowding
out effect.
To explore potential nonlinearities in the relation between inflation and investment, and
also to relate the duration of the spells of high inflation to their impact, it is useful to
classify different inflationary experiences in terms of their intensity. One classification (more
appropriate for "chronic" high inflation countries) was proposed by Dornbusch and Fischer
(1991): (i) moderate inflation refers to rates of price increase between 15 and 30 percent per
year for at least three consecutive years; (ii) high inflation refers to rates between 30 and
100 percent per year; (iii) extreme inflation refers to rates between 100 and 1,000 percent
per year; and (iv) hyperinflation refers to rates above 1,000 percent per year.l8
'
8The norm of inflation clearly depends on the region or country. For several OECD economies, rates of
inflation in excess of 10 percent per year would be considered as intolerable or "extreme".
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Table 9 summarizes the experiences of inflation and their aftermath for several countries.
It shows that the slide from "low" to "moderate" inflation has no significant effect on capital
formation. On the contrary, in some cases, like Mexico and Korea in the mid to late 1970s,
the slide from low inflation to moderate inflation came along with an increase in (mostly
public) investment rates. 19
On the other hand, Table 9 shows that in countries in which inflation went from low
to high two-digit levels and then to three digits, investment was more severely affected.
For example, in Mexico, Brazil, and Israel, investment declined by 5 percentage points of
GDP (or more) in the 1980s (a period of severe acceleration of inflation in these countries)
compared to the average levels of the 1960s and 1970s.
A more extreme case of protracted instability is Argentina. This country had an average
annual inflation rate around 260 percent for 14 years - between 1975 and 1988 - before
drifting to hyperinflation in 1989-90. This is a case of extremely prolonged inflation and at a
very high level. No wonder, then, that capital formation collapsed in Argentina in the 1980s;
the share of investment in GDP declined by more than 10 percentage points in the 1980s
from its average of the 1960s and 1970s. Another extreme case is Bolivia, which experienced
hyperinflation in 1984-85.2o
Regarding the duration of the spells of inflation the data show that the higher the rate
of inflation, the shorter the duration of the inflationary episode. Low and moderate inflation
(below 30 percent per year) tend to be relatively stable, high inflation (between 30 and 100
percent) less so, three-digit inflations often last between 2 to 5 years, and hyperinflation may
last from 6 months to 18 months.
Figures 4 and 5 show the relationship between inflation and the ratio of investment (total
and private) to GDP for Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Israel and Mexico, using decade
averages for the 1960s, 1970s and 1980s. These figures show a negative relationship between
19See Lustig (1992) and Collins and Park (1989). In fact, in the short term, inflation and investment may
move in the same direction following an increase in public investment or other exogenous demand shock.
20The share of total investment in GDP in Bolivia was only 9 percent in the period 1983-90, down from 23
percent in the pre-inflation period. The period 1983-90 includes both the hyperinflation and its subsequent
stabilization.
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the average rate of inflation and the average investment-to-GDP ratio when annual inflation
is over 50 percent (particularly during the 1970 and 1980s). However, when the average
annual inflation rate is less than 50 percent (e.g. in the 1960s), the relationship between
inflation and investment is much less clear. This suggests that the relationship between
inflation and investment is highly nonlinear.
Stabilizations and the Response of Investment.
Stabilizing inflation is a precondition for a resumption of investment in an economy that
has undergone a period of high price instability. However, accumulated evidence shows that
the resumption of investment and growth after the implementation of a stabilization pro-
gram is a slow process. There are several reasons for this: (i) restrictive monetary policies
push up real interest rates, thus depressing investment and output growth; (ii) there is a
potential credibility problem in the aftermath of stabilization that makes investors reluctant
to commit resources given doubts as to whether the stabilization program will succeed. This
tends to delay the recovery of investment in the aftermath of stabilization; (iii) governments
tend to cut public investment during the course of fiscal adjustment, and if public invest-
ment, particularly in infrastructure, telecommunications and the like, is complementary with
private investment, this will contribute to a decline in aggregate capital accumulation; (iv)
If the stabilization program takes place in a context of reduced foreign financing (e.g. Latin
America in the 1980s), the resumption of investment in the aftermath of stabilization will
be more elusive. (See Sachs (1989) and Serven and Solimano (1992, 1993).)
Table 10 summarizes four stabilization programs carried out in the 1970s and 1980s:
Chile (1975), Israel (1985), Bolivia (1985), and Mexico (late 1987).21 In three of the four
cases, the investment share remained below its pre-inflation during the first five years after
the stabilization program was launched, suggesting that the resumption of investment (and
growth) after the implementation of a stabilization program is a slow process. 22
21For recent studies of these stabilization programs see Corbo and Solimano (1991) for Chile, Bruno and
Meridor (1991) for Israel, Morales (1991) for Bolivia, and Ortiz (1991) for Mexico. Chile and Bolivia are
cases of orthodox stabilization (money based), and Israel and Mexico are cases of heterodox stabilization
(multiple-anchor); see Bruno et. al. (1991) and Kiguel and Liviatan (1992).
22 For additional evidence on this for a larger group of countries, see Dornbusch (1991), Corden (1991),
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Also, there seems to be no correlation between the speed of disinflation and the speed of
investment recovery. Bolivia ended its hyperinflation of 1985 very quickly, while investment
remained depressed for many years thereafter. In contrast, disinflation in Chile after 1975
was slow and the immediate investment response to the stabilization plan was fast.2 3 As for
the effect of program characteristics on the performance of investment after stabilization,
the evidence shows no clear differences in the behavior of investment between orthodox
(money-based) and heterodox (multiple-anchor-based) stabilization programs.
In summary, the country evidence shows that the restoration of stability after a period
of high inflation and uncertainty is likely to be accompanied by depressed capital formation,
as investors require time to be convinced that the uncertainty is indeed reduced and that
stability will be consolidated.
8. Conclusions.
We have outlined some of the empirical implications of the recent theoretical literature
on irreversible investment and the value of waiting, and then examined its relevance for
aggregate investment in a set of industrialized and developing countries. We have shown
that if the exogenous stochastic state variables follow Brownian motions, uncertainty can be
summarized by the volatility of the marginal profitability of capital, which will itself follow a
controlled Brownian motion. An increase in this volatility will increase the critical required
return for investment, and hence should reduce investment spending - in the short run.
Unfortunately, we can say little about the effect of such an increase in volatility on the long-
run steady-state level of investment, investment-to-output ratio, or other such measures.
This does not mean, however, that volatility is not an important determinant of invest-
ment spending. Given the lags involved in planning and implementing large-scale invest-
ment programs, and given that the real and perceived riskiness of investing can change over
decades, the "short run" can easily be ten or twenty years.
We therefore conducted our empirical tests by examining the relationship between volatil-
Solimano (1992a).
23See Solimano (1992b).
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ity and investment across decades for a set of countries. We found that the relationship is
negative but moderate in size, and is of greater magnitude for developing countries. We also
tried to relate the volatility of the marginal profitability of capital to indicia of economic
instability - such as inflation and its volatility - and to indicia of political instability. Only
inflation is at all robust as an explanator of the marginal profitability of capital. In addition,
inflation is the only economic risk index that strongly explains investment in panel regres-
sions using annual data. These results lend support to the view that controlling inflation
should be one of the most important objectives of economic policy.
Our results are subject, however, to some important caveats. First, our construction
of series for the marginal profitability of capital was problematic for several developing
countries with poor or fragmentary data on the capital stock and on factor prices. The high
aggregation level and poor data call for caution in interpreting the series for this variable
for some countries. Future work in improving this data and extending it to the sectoral
level is needed. Second, the size of our sample (29 countries) has been a limiting factor in
this work, and needs to be enlarged if we are to obtain more conclusive results. Third, we
have worked within the framework of a very simple theoretical model (e.g., a Cobb-Douglas
production function with constant returns), so that we could ignore idiosyncratic sources of
uncertainty, and easily estimate the marginal profitability of capital. Fourth, we have ignored
the relationship between private and public investment (as well as associated measurement
problems), nor have we examined possible differences in the effects of instability on different
types of investment (e.g., equipment versus structures).
There are also fundamental problems in interpreting and measuring instability. The un-
derlying probability of a future change in policy regime (a peso problem") is not necessarily
conveyed in our data, and is an obvious limitation of our analysis. Understanding the forces
that make one country or region persistently more unstable than others is a complex problem
related to differences in basic economic structures, in the workings of fiscal and monetary
institutions, and in the characteristics of the political process and the distributive conflicts
it brings about.
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Appendix
The inputs used to construct series for the marginal profitability of capital for each country,
as well as the other variables used in this work, came from the following sources:
1. Gross Capital Stock: Local currency value at constant prices of year-average of the
sum of machinery and equipment and non-residential structures. It excludes govern-
ment durable goods for military use. For those countries where a complete capital
stock series was unavailable, the capital stock was constructed as follows: Given an
initial value of the capital stock for a base year using actual data on gross investment
and depreciation rates we generated annual estimates of the capital stock. The de-
preciation rate is chosen so that the generated value match the actual value of the
capital stock for another year in which there is available information. Sources: Ar-
gentina, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Mexico and Venezuela, Hofman (1991). Korea and
Taiwan, Hofman (1992). Japan, Netherlands, France, Germany, US and the U.K.,
Madison (1992). Other countries, Dadkhah and Zahedi (1990) and estimation using
the perpetual inventory method.
2. GDP, Investment, GDP and Investment Deflators: Real GDP in local currency.
The ratio of investment to GDP is the ratio of real investment to real GDP (ratio of
nominal investment to nominal GDP times the ratio of the GDP deflator to invest-
ment deflator). Sources: All countries, IFS database (1992), for Taiwan World Bank
database (1992)
3. Employment: Total workers per year. Source: Summers and Heston (1991).
4. Imported Materials: Defined as total imports minus imports of machinery and
equipment, at real domestic currency values. Sources: UN (1992b), except for Korea,
Korea (1990) and Taiwan, Republic of China (1991).
5. Nominal Exchange Rate: Units of domestic currency per unit of foreign currency
(U.S.$ except for the U.S.). Source: IFS database (1992).
6. Import Deflator for Intermediate Goods: Source: Latin American countries and
Asian countries, World Bank (1992); Korea, Korea (1992); Taiwan, Republic of China
(1992); Japan, Netherlands, France, Germany, U.K. and the U.S., European Economic
Community (1992); rest of the OECD countries, OECD (1992).
7. Inflation Rate: The annual average rate of change of the Consumer Price Index.
Source: IFS database (1992).
8. Real Price of Labor: Average manufacturing wage for Argentina, Brazil, Colombia,
Chile, Mexico, Venezuela, Korea, Thailand, Malaysia, Hong Kong, Singapore. Other
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developing countries, average non-agriculture wage. For OECD countries, the real
compensation per employee. Deflated by the GDP deflator. Sources: ECLAC (1992),
EEC (1992), UN (1992a).
9. Real Price of Imported Materials: For Latin American and Asian countries, nom-
inal exchange rate times dollar price of imported goods divided by GDP deflator. For
OECD, implicit deflator for imported intermediate goods deflated by the GDP deflator.
Sources: IFS data base, EEC (1992).
10. Real Exchange Rate: Nominal exchange rate times a trade weighted price index of
exported and imported goods divided by the GDP deflator. Source: IFS database.
11. Labor and Capital Shares: Factor shares in GDP are at factor cost net of capital
consumption and indirect taxes. Sources: Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Mexico
and Venezuela, ECLAC (1991). Korea and Taiwan, Korea (1992) and Republic of
China (1989), respectively. France, Germany, Japan, Netherlands, UK, U.S., European
Economic Community (1992a). Other countries, United Nations, (1992).
12. Public and Private Investment: Public investment is investment of general govern-
ment. Private investment is calculated as the difference between total fixed investment
from national accounts and public investment. Sources: OECD (1992) for OECD
countries, World Bank (1992) and Pfeffermandn and Madarassy (1993) for developing
countries.
13. Political Variables: PROB is the annual probability of a change in government, es-
timated by a probit model on time series-data for the period 1948-1982, from Cukier-
man, Edwards, and Tabellini (1992). ASSASS, CONCHG, CRISIS, REVOL, RIOT,
and STRIKE are defined in Tables 5 and 6, and are from Barro and Wolf (1991).
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Table 1 - Marginal Profitability of Capital and Investment.
1962 - 1971 1972 - 1980
COUNTRY SDAB AB I/GDP SDAB AB I/GDP SDAB AB I/GDP
Argentina
Brazil
Chile
Colombia
Hong Kong
Israel
Korea
Malaysia
Mexico
Taiwan
Philip.
Singapore
Thailand
Venezuela
Austria
Belgium
Canada
Denmark
Finland
France
Germany
Ireland
Italy
Japan
Nether.
Norway
Portugal
Spain
U.K.
U.S.
.066
.079
.085
.030
.074
.164
.083
.036
.032
.072
.328
.076
.000
.047
.055
.054
.070
.150
.105
.048
.101
.120
.132
.134
.077
.048
.102
.098
.157
.064
.021
-.017
-.021
.023
.014
.022
-.021
.004
.019
.052
-.249
.106
-. 135
.005
.025
.010
.015
-. 001
.003
-. 014
-. 029
.083
.021
-.018
.022
.005
-. 015
-. 019
-. 072
-. 003
.101
.153
.092
.179
.273
.271
.102
.181
.136
.090
.140
.221
.144
.111
.205
.191
.151
.199
.238
.190
.212
.164
.246
.231
.210
.231
.274
.206
.138
.159
.190
.075
.125
.049
.099
.145
.063
.078
.057
.102
1.182
.082
.049
.062
.086
.115
.092
.158
.089
.123
.118
.356
.136
.137
.154
.122
.289
.074
.144
.090
.108
-. 025
-. 016
.030
-. 007
-. 037
-.072
-. 015
.006
-.046
-.225
-.002
.003
-.060
-.021
-.082
-.012
-.046
.016
-.063
-.030
-. 077
.028
-.092
-.051
-. 002
-. 166
-.070
-.030
-.023
.109
.209
.071
.174
.237
.255
.199
.280
.146
.126
.155
.357
.180
.141
.218
.174
.163
.193
.237
.202
.185
.201
.211
.258
.183
.252
.264
.226
.142
.163
.221
.111
.150
.043
.102
.086
.036
.067
.048
.080
.987
.071
.033
.113
.040
.140
.118
.100
.065
.084
.059
.144
.060
.060
.087
.128
.134
.127
.074
.101
-. 069
-. 026
-.002
-.033
.022
.012
.002
-. 034
-. 020
.002
-. 311
.043
-.022
-. 057
.018
.039
.039
.070
.057
.002
.009
.047
-.006
.028
.016
-.025
.064
.036
.014
.029
.056
.133
.096
.180
.227
.185
.252
.324
.129
.126
.169
.401
.178
.082
.196
.146
.186
.156
.212
.172
.178
.178
.176
.237
.167
.224
.242
.182
.154
.162
Note: For each subperiod, table shows the standard deviation (SDAB) and mean (B)
of the annual log change in the marginal profitability of capital, B(t), along with private
investment as a percentage of GDP.
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Table 2 - Cross-Section Regressions of Threshold Proxies
Note: SDAB is the sample standard deviation of Ab(t) = A log B(t), and AB is the sample
mean of Ab(t). Standard errors corrected for heteroscedasticity are shown in parentheses.
A * denotes significance at the 5 percent level.
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Dependent Var. Const. SDAB AB R 2
DBDEC -.0203 3.536* -2.150* .638
(.0604) (0.627) (1.465)
DBQUINT -. 0249 3.225* -3.601* .652
(.0579) (0.573) (1.377)
DBKDEC .0290 0.389 -4.518* .153
(.0842) (0.814) (2.035)
DBKQUINT -.0301 1.0419 -4.601* .195
(.0939) (0.913) (1.932)
Table 3 - Regressions of Private Investment
Note: Dependent variable is (IPRI/GDP)T, the ratio of private investment to GDP, aver-
aged over time interval T, where T = (1962-1971), (1972-1980), and (1981-1989), and mea-
sured in percentage points. SDABT is the sample standard deviation of Ab(t) = A log B(t),
and ABT is the sample mean of Ab(t) for subperiod T. Standard errors corrected for het-
eroscedasticity are shown in parentheses. A * denotes significance at the 5 percent level.
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SAMPLE Const. DUM8 1l 8 9 (IPRI/GDP)T-1 SDABT ABT R 2
All 5.042* -3.223* .9219* -18.107 -4.160 .699
Countries (1.942) (1.061) (.0957) (9.900) (8.363)
All 5.086* -3.358* .9208* -17.284 .698
Countries (1.982) (0.948) (.0964) (9.849)
LDC's 7.330* -4.151* .9804* -40.692* 3.341 .753
(2.666) (1.807) (.1377) (11.846) (16.056)
LDC's 7.187* -4.180* .9853* -40.336* .752
(2.604) (1.792) (.1378) (11.678)
OECD 4.526* -1.402 .7549* 2.005 -7.389 .755
(1.342) (0.791) (.0750) (5.787) (8.753)
OECD 4.464* -1.848* .7611* 3.889 .749
(1.310) (0.670) (.0742) (4.620)
Table 4 - Real Interest Rate Regressions
Note: Dependent variable is RT, the real interest rate averaged over time interval T, where
T = (1972-1980) and (1981-1989). (The period 1962-71 was omitted because of insufficient
data.) Standard errors corrected for heteroscedasticity are shown in parentheses. A * denotes
significance at the 5 percent level.
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Sample Const. SDABT ABT DUM8 1-89 R 2
All .5930 -38.15 -61.15 11.015* .294
Countries (2.252) (20.26) (35.76) (3.248)
LDC's 2.471 -91.69* -56.04 14.38* .353
(3.602) (38.14) (44.04) (4.704)
OECD 2.213 -10.67 4.132 4.677* .597
(1.249) (5.772) (14.33) (1.397)
Table 5 - Correlates of Volatility
Note: Table shows cross-sectional correlation coefficients for SDAB and various indicia
of economic and/or political instability. INF is the mean inflation rate, SDAINF is the
annual standard deviation of the change in the inflation rate, SDARER is the standard
deviation of the change in the real exchange rate, SDAR is the standard deviation of the
change in the real interest rate, PROB is an estimate, by Cukierman, Edwards, and Tabellini
(1992), of the probability of a change in government in any year, and ASSASS, CRISIS,
STRIKE, RIOT, REVOL, and CONCHGE are the average number of assassinations,
government crises, strikes, riots, revolutions, and constitutional changes per year, and are
from Barro and Wolf (1991).
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Correlation of
SDAB with: LDC's OECD
INF .4105 .3970
SDAINF .3816 .4414
SDARER -.0851 .1014
SDAR .3096 .7213
PROB -. 0056 -.1922
ASSASS .4026 -. 0580
CRISIS .0680 -.1887
STRIKE .5891 -.1408
RIOT .5054 -.0806
REVOL -.0103 .0210
CONCHGE -.2357 -.1022
Table 6 - Explaining Volatility
Note: Table shows regressions of SDAB on indicia of economic and/or political instability.
INF is the mean inflation rate, SDARER is the standard deviation of the annual change in
the real exchange rate, PROB is an estimate, by Cukierman, Edwards and Tabellini (1992),
of the probability of a change in government, and CRISIS, STRIKE, and RIOT are the
average number of government crises, strikes, and riots per year, and are from Barro and
Wolf (1991). Standard errors corrected for heteroscedasticity are shown in parentheses. A *
denotes significance at the 5 percent level.
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Const. INF SDRER PROB CRISIS RIOT STRIKE R 2 NOB
A. LDC's
.0625* .00020 .0017 .478 13
(.0145) (.00012) (.0019)
.0894* .00014* -.0010 -.0509 .172 8:
(.0349) (.00006) (.0025) (.0578)
.0631* .00004 -.0011 .0076 .0074 .0743* .721 10
(.0164) (.00008) (.0014) (.0565) (.0085) (.0268)
B. OECD
.0454* .0113* -.0005 .395 16
(.0303) (.0031) (.0027)
.0903* .0120* -.0028 -. 0700* .440 16
(.0396) (.0027) (.0036) (.0299)
.0052 .0139 .0052 -.0042 .0001 -. 0591 .361 14
(.0478) (.0077) (.0031) (.0220) (.0143) (.0337)
Table 7 - Panel Regressions
Countries: France, Germany, Japan, Netherlands, U.K., U.S.
Eqn. Lagged Dep. GRTH_I1 INF SDINF SDRER 'IgDp R 2
A. Dependent Variable: ITOT/GDP
(1) .889* .101* -. 088* .0004 -.038 .867
(.029) (.024) (.021) (.489) (.022)
(2) .851* .117* -.057 -. 065* .851
(.030) (.023) (.509) (.024)
(3) .889* .101* -. 088* -. 038* .867
(.029) (.023) (.020) (.022)
B. Dependent Variable: IPRI/GDP
(4) .833* .101* -. 053* -.025 .782
(.037) (.023) (.018) (.020)
(5) .082* .112* -.220 -.038 .773
(.036) (.023) (.444) (.021)
(6) .833* .099* -. 056* .145 -.024 .783
(.037) (.024) (.019) (.463) (.020)
(7) .890* .090* -. 062* -. 052* -. 270* .798
(.038) (.022) (.020) (.023) (.100)
(8) .848* .103* -.275 -. 065* -. 241* .785
(.038) (.023) (.460) (.025) (.100)
(9) .889* .088* -. 065* .136 -. 051* -.269 .798
(.029) (.024) (.021) (.482) (.023) (.099)
Note: Each equation is a panel regression with 180 observations. GRTH is the rate of
growth of real GDP, INF is the mean inflation rate for the year, SDINF is the sample
standard deviation of each year's monthly observations of inflation, SDRER is the standard
deviation of the real exchange rate, and IPUB/GDP is the ratio of public investment
to GDP. Standard errors corrected for heteroscedasticity are in parentheses. A * denotes
significance at the 5 percent level.
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I
I
III
Countries:
Table 8 - Panel Regressions
Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Mexico, Israel, Bolivia
Note: Each equation is a panel regression with 180 observations. GRTH is the rate of
growth of real GDP, INF is the mean inflation rate for the year, SDINF is the sample
standard deviation of each year's monthly observations of inflation, SDRER is the standard
deviation of the real exchange rate, and IPUB/GDP is the ratio of public investment
to GDP. Standard errors corrected for heteroscedasticity are in parentheses. A * denotes
significance at the 5 percent level.
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Eqn. Lagged Dep. GRTH_ 1 INF SDINF SDRER IPDp R
A. Dependent Variable: ITOT/GDP
(1) .7616* .1743* -. 00016* -. 0924* .797
(.0592) (.0338) (.00007) (.0241)
(2) .7582* .1774* -.0304 .0748* .797
(.0621) (.0340) (.0316) (.0349)
(3) .7571* .1756* -. 00013* -. 0225 -. 0766* .797
(.0621) (.0339) (.00006) (.0318) (.0348)
B. Dependent Variable: IPRI/GDP
(4) .7529* .1154* -.00009 -.0365 .697
(.0495) (.0295) (.00007) (.0191)
(5) .7508* .1172* -.0107 -.0315 .697
(.0503) (.0293) (.0269) (.0320)
(6) .7511 * .1157* -.00009 -.0054 -.0327 .697
(.0503) (.0294) (.00006) (.0271) (.0321)
(7) .7676* .1317* -.00013 -. 0420* -. 1229* .708
(.0505) (.0321) (.00007) (.0199) (.0538)
(8) .7634* .1341* -.0182 -.0324 -. 1216* .707
(.0510) (.0320) (.0269) (.0317) (.0543)
(9) .7641* .1324* -.00011 -.0114 -.0341 -. 1242* .708
(.0509) (.0320) (.00006) (.0275) (.0319) (.0543)
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